The seeming contradictions in one atheist's views of morality

From The Consequentalism FAQ:

7.6: Wouldn't utilitarianism mean if there was some monster or alien or something whose feelings and preferences were a gazillion times stronger than our own, that monster would have so much moral value that its mild inconveniences would be more morally important than the entire fate of humanity?
Maybe.
Imagine two ant philosophers talking to each other about the same question. “Imagine," they said, “some being with such intense consciousness, intellect, and emotion that it would be morally better to destroy an entire ant colony than to let that being suffer so much as a sprained ankle."
But I think humans are such a being! I would rather see an entire ant colony destroyed than have a human suffer so much as a sprained ankle. And this isn't just human chauvinism either - I think I could support my feelings on this issue by pointing out how much stronger feelings, preferences, and experiences humans have than ants (presumably) do.
I can't imagine a creature as far beyond us as we are beyond ants, but if such a creature existed I think it's possible that if I could imagine it, I would agree that its preferences were vastly more important than those of humans.

This is the same FAQ that also asks:

2.3: What about God? Could morality come from God?

The answer to that second question in 2.3 earlier in the FAQ is argued to be no, although 7.6 on moral weight seems to provide a pretty reasonable answer to that challenge.